Failed State Variable scores are calculated by determining an average score from a totalitarian sample (Iran, Syria, N. Korea, etc) and using this score as an anchor. Then the number of countries that come before and after this totalitarian anchor are divided by five to delimit quintiles and define country scores. The moderate negative correlations between terrorist groups and the Failed State Variable indicates that larger numbers of terrorist groups correlate to lower scores (i.e. 1GS and 1EG) of the variable. This would seem to fall in line with the key finding, which states "Terrorist groups... are only weakly negatively correlated (-.1) with strong NSAs of any type anywhere in Africa, suggesting that terrorists, at least in this region, prefer countries with relatively more rather than less state control." Moreover, this negative correlation is stronger, on average, in states on the Government Sanctioned side of the role potential spectrum (GS= .50, EG= .18). It is possible that this derivation is skewed by Western States which, on average, show a positive correlation between Failed States variable and active terrorist groups. We might also conclude that anarchic states, in general, have more insurgent, rebel, partisan, etc groups that are determined to be terrorist groups, when in fact they simply warring factions with standing armies who use terrorist styled tactics to pursue their desired ends. However we view this data, there is indication that the presence of active terrorist groups correlates to strong government control and slightly favors the Government Sanctioned Side of the role potential spectrum. This is in keeping with the Frustration Aggression Hypothesis.
Ted Robert Gurr (1970)[i] proposed the Relative-Deprivation hypothesis. He asserts “The necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment’s apparent value capabilities. This deprivation may be individual or collective” (Gurr, 1970). J.C. Davies (1973)[ii] adapted Gurr’s model to produce the Frustration-Aggression Model. Davies hypothesizes “much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives” (1973). This hypothesis is within keeping with a Self-Efficacy model of terrorism. Many terrorist groups start out as legitimate political parties and/or organizations, yet after failure to actualize their political goals they turn to violence.
To demonstrate this prospective we may consider the lineage of communist parties in Puerto Rico. The Spanish ceded Puerto Rico as a result of the Spanish-American War (1898). However, Spain had conferred independence on Puerto Rico with the 1897 Charter of Autonomy. Many Puerto Rican affluents asserted that Spain therefore could not cede Puerto Rico to the US. The National Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) was formed in the 1920s on the platform of Puerto Rican independence. At first the NPPR was a legitimate political party, which used legitimate political venues to pursue its goals. A shift occurred in 1932 when they were soundly defeated in Puerto Rican elections. The NPPR then turned to violence, adopting a fascist model. This is an important move because it demonstrates the implicit relationship between aggression and efficacy. In Nov 1950 the NPPR attempted to assassinate President Harry S. Truman. In March 1954 four NPPR members assaulted congress, firing automatic rifles from the gallery balcony.
Although this model unlikely describes all occurrence and types of terrorist activity, as is consistent with our findings this perspective demonstrates three important points. 1) Terrorist groups may form due to their inability to use Government Sanctioned role potentials to achieve desired goals. 2) Terrorist groups do not necessarily need to represent a large majority popular base. 3) It is likely that terrorist aggression born from frustration happens when there are government sanctioned political venues present, which are supposed to provide some sort of representation. Therefore, its is not a matter of whether these political venues exist yet whether existing venues are effective. To be sure, ineffective representation or "for show" elections are more likely to be a cause of terrorist aggression due to political frustration, than the absence of such venues.
[i] Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
[ii] Davies, T.R. “Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War.” Pages 234–60 in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973.
Ted Robert Gurr (1970)[i] proposed the Relative-Deprivation hypothesis. He asserts “The necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment’s apparent value capabilities. This deprivation may be individual or collective” (Gurr, 1970). J.C. Davies (1973)[ii] adapted Gurr’s model to produce the Frustration-Aggression Model. Davies hypothesizes “much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives” (1973). This hypothesis is within keeping with a Self-Efficacy model of terrorism. Many terrorist groups start out as legitimate political parties and/or organizations, yet after failure to actualize their political goals they turn to violence.
To demonstrate this prospective we may consider the lineage of communist parties in Puerto Rico. The Spanish ceded Puerto Rico as a result of the Spanish-American War (1898). However, Spain had conferred independence on Puerto Rico with the 1897 Charter of Autonomy. Many Puerto Rican affluents asserted that Spain therefore could not cede Puerto Rico to the US. The National Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) was formed in the 1920s on the platform of Puerto Rican independence. At first the NPPR was a legitimate political party, which used legitimate political venues to pursue its goals. A shift occurred in 1932 when they were soundly defeated in Puerto Rican elections. The NPPR then turned to violence, adopting a fascist model. This is an important move because it demonstrates the implicit relationship between aggression and efficacy. In Nov 1950 the NPPR attempted to assassinate President Harry S. Truman. In March 1954 four NPPR members assaulted congress, firing automatic rifles from the gallery balcony.
Although this model unlikely describes all occurrence and types of terrorist activity, as is consistent with our findings this perspective demonstrates three important points. 1) Terrorist groups may form due to their inability to use Government Sanctioned role potentials to achieve desired goals. 2) Terrorist groups do not necessarily need to represent a large majority popular base. 3) It is likely that terrorist aggression born from frustration happens when there are government sanctioned political venues present, which are supposed to provide some sort of representation. Therefore, its is not a matter of whether these political venues exist yet whether existing venues are effective. To be sure, ineffective representation or "for show" elections are more likely to be a cause of terrorist aggression due to political frustration, than the absence of such venues.
[i] Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
[ii] Davies, T.R. “Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War.” Pages 234–60 in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973.